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Preliminary Remarks
The following text is not by far intended to provide a detailed political and le-
gal analysis of developments and priority shifts of immigration policies in Ger-
many since the recruitment period of the 1960s. Rather than that, special at-
tention  will  be  given  to  the  historic-social  context  (e.g.,  in  the  sense  of 
attitudes of official political actors towards the “foreigner question”) in whose 
framework debates concerning migration/migrants have been (or are still) on-
going. Hereby perceptions of  integration and participation of foreigners, to-
gether with perceptions of socio-political order and multiculturalism underly-
ing and steering the flow of the debates will be of interest. Formulated in an 
ideology-critical way, it shall be read “between” the lines of written and oral 
statements in order to show tendencies within the process of the relation(s) 
between the foreigners and the political sphere (reflected in the wide scope of 
responsibility and action of the bourgeois state) on the one hand, and the so-
cial sphere (reflected in the wide scope of action of social actors) on the other 
hand. A special emphasis shall be hereby given to the structural dimension of 
immigration policies best seen within the context of their possible functionali-
zation as a mechanism to solve social tensions. The topic of this article is by no 
way  specific  for  Germany  because  an  important  aspect  of  the  above-men-
tioned structural dimension is the increasingly promoted global cross-linkage 
of politics and policy-making. Immigration policies, especially in their form as 
asylum procedures and practices, are currently carried on as part of Europe-
wide coordination activities including countries at the periphery of Europe. A 
concrete example for this development is an attempt to build up at least seven 
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refugee  reception  and  removal  centers  in  Turkey  within  the  framework  of 
measures for the EU integration process. Despite this global dimension of im-
migration policies in a narrow sense and migration movements in a broader 
sense, there are still some important historic-social and theoretical reasons re-
maining for employing the “German case”, as it is done in this text.
Firstly, the experience of organized mass labor migration having started 
in  the  midst  of  the 1950s of  the  last  century to  the industrialized Western 
European countries was factually a Turkish-German one. The number of Turk-
ish citizens and/or people having a Turkish background living and working in 
Germany is higher than in all other Western European receiving countries to-
gether. Besides this quantitative dimension, we can state ongoing controver-
sial  debates on integration, identity, multiculturalism, freedom and security 
hard to find elsewhere in such an intensity. Starting with the German reunifi-
cation in 1991, a lot of political actors saw the necessity to (re-) construct a new 
(or a new-old) German identity thought to be “lost” within the framework of 
developments after World War II having resulted in the establishment of two 
“Germanies”. For those actors the migrants are somehow the counter-image of 
such a “new” identity.1
Secondly, the mass recruitment of a foreign labor force on the basis of bi-
lateral agreements was a relatively new experience for Germany. This migra-
tion  movement  resulted  in  social  dynamics  (such  as  family  reunification), 
which should be “conducted” via political and legal means. Hereby, the long 
tradition of thought emphasizing the uniqueness of the state as an idealized 
sphere of distributing justice and balancing out social conflicts, as we can see 
it in the conservative attitude of Adam Müller’s “political romanticism” of the 
early 19th century, and in the extensive philosophical and theoretical research 
on state law2 finding its most comprehensive expression by Hegel in his Philo-
sophy of  Law, and under German fascism in Carl Schmitt’s relocation of the 
state as the main agent of the political, enabled a very fast establishment of 
political and legal regulations later being incorporated into the Immigration 
Law of 1965, which was the first systematically formulated and in itself closed 
legal  framework in Germany regulating the relation between the foreigner 
and the bourgeois state. Having mentioned above historico-social experience 
1 Penitsch (2003, p. 17).
2 Jann (1989, p. 39).
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and the tradition of state law, it seems plausible to evaluate Germany as one, if 
not the main actor, of Europe-wide coordinated immigration policies.3
The Recruitment Period of the 1960s: 
Immigration Policies in the Form of Labor Market Policies
After  its  integration  into  the  political-institutional  framework  of  a  “free” 
Europe evaluated as the “antithesis” of the Eastern European socialist states 
under the leadership of the Soviet Union, Federal Germany’s primary aim was 
to rebuild its traditional industrial sectors. Until the mid-1950s, this aim could 
be realized to a broad extent by employing a labor force from its former East-
ern territories and from those coming from Eastern Germany. The canalizing of 
this  “national” labor force mentioned above, industrial  sectors  were accom-
panied by an extensive capital and technology transfer from the USA to the 
Western  European  countries,4 altogether  resulting  in  an  increase  of  con-
sumptive needs enabling the establishment of new industrial sectors. Thus, in 
the mid-1950s, the demand for a labor force could no longer be supplied via the 
mentioned labor markets. A short-term solution could be provided by transfer-
ring the labor force from the agricultural to the industrial sector due to the rel-
atively higher wages in the industrial sector compared to agricultural produc-
tion.5 This time a lack of labor force occurred in the agricultural  sector and 
consequently demands for a stately organized recruitment and employment of 
foreign labor force – concretely “the temporary employment of Italian agricul-
tural workers”6 – were articulated for the first time in 1955 by parts of the pro-
fessional  organization of  the  Farmers’ Union of  Baden-Wurttemberg Province 
(Bauernverband Baden-Württemberg). 
In addition to the above-mentioned, economic preconditions for opening 
the labor market and providing access to a foreign labor force with the recruit-
ment  and  employment  of  Italian  workers  in  the  agricultural  sector, demo-
graphic changes such as the increase of the older population (of an age of 65 
3 Niblett (2005, p. 43). 
4 According to Mandel (1982, p. 11), this transfer of resources increased from approximately 7.2 billion USD to an amount of 
60 billion USD in 1967.
5 Dohse (1981, p. 148).
6 Meier-Braun (1979, p. 18).
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and above)7 and the decrease of the working population (of an age between 15 
and  65)  as  a  result  of  World  War  II,  and  furthermore  social  and  political 
changes such as the reduction of the weekly working time to 45 hours in 19568 
and the re-organization of a Federal German army in the mid-1950s9 paved the 
way for  the  later  bi-lateral  recruitment  agreements  between  Germany and 
countries like Italy (1955), Spain (1960), Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco 
(1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and (the former) Yugoslavia (1968).10 
The foundations of the first legal regulations in the field of immigra-
tion policies  were laid under above-mentioned conditions, which were to a 
great extent (if not solely) determined by the economic needs of a “new” Ger-
many  trying to  compete  with  the  other  traditional  industrialized countries 
such as Great Britain and France. In the mid-1950s, the wide-spread term “eco-
nomic miracle” did reflect Federal Germany’s attempt to organize its economy 
in a framework of free competitive market mechanisms under the guidance of 
Ludwig Ehrhard, who started his career as Minister of Economics in the Bavari-
an cabinet, later in the federal government in the same position, and who fi-
nally became Chancellor between the years 1963 and 1966.
Despite the mentioned liberal economic priorities of the economic struc-
turization of Germany, favoring the state remained important for “conserva-
tive” politicians like Ehrhard. In this context, the emphasis on a “Social Market 
Economy” accentuating differences from a “pure” competitive economy may 
be understandable. The orientation towards a market economy was one of the 
steps that Germany did undergo to break with the past having culminated into 
fascist dictatorship. But, improvements on the level of living and working con-
7 The estimations concerning the number of people having been killed during World War II is – on the lowest level – around 
30 million. According to Borrie, the regional distribution is as follows: Western Europe – 7.8 million, Eastern Europe (without 
the consideration of the Soviet Union) – 5.6 million and the Soviet Union – 17 million. Not included is the number  
of persons killed in the concentration camps of the German fascist  dictatorship.  Borrie (1970),  Spanier (1969, 
pp. 93–94).
8 Hammer (1976, p. 14).
9 The re-organization of the army (Bundeswehr) cannot be underestimated in terms of partially draining out the labor  
market. Thus, the number of persons being employed there increased from 125,000 in 1957 to 450,000 in 1965. So, having 
this precondition for the opening of the German labor market in mind (among others), it is in no sense coincidental that, in 
the time period of the early 1960s up to the recruitment stop in 1973, recruitment of a foreign labor force determined by the 
needs of the entrepreneurs was very fast and without any decisive “disturbance” coming from possible interventions from 
social actors such as labor unions.
10 In the short-lasting recession period of 1966/67, the number of foreign laborers surpassed one million, reaching a climax 
of 2.6 million in 1973, the year when a recruitment stop was planned and executed. (Spies 1982, pp. 6–7), O’Brien (1988, 
p. 115).
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ditions for the native population, which honestly have to be stated, went not 
parallel with developments concerning legal regulations determining the rela-
tion between the foreigners and the state. Here, a radical “break” with the past, 
as it was often articulated in the public and expressed in the Basic Law of Ger-
many  formulating  basic  and  individual  rights  against  an  overwhelming 
powerful state cannot be stated. 
Rather than being an extension of individual rights the legal regulations 
in the early 1950s until the passing of the first systematic Aliens’ Law of 1965 
did inherit continuities both on an administrative and political  level, which 
can be moderately named “authoritarian” in the sense of prioritizing the in-
terests of the main political actor (which is the state) and the economic actors 
by – at the same time – evaluating the interests of the foreigners as secondary. 
Thus, the social aspects of migration, such as integration, is factually not a top-
ic of these recruitment years. The power of bureaucracy continued in the form 
of delegating extensive responsibilities to the Immigration Bureaus, which can 
be most clearly seen in the field of residence permits. According to the regulat-
ory contents of the Foreigner Police Decree of August 8, 1938, which continued 
to be valid until  1965, foreigners who applied for a residence permit had to 
prove that they were “worthy of the hospitality shown them”. Later, in the Al-
iens’ Law of 1965, this term was replaced by the formulation of the “interests of 
the Federal Republic of Germany”.11 This change which can be evaluated as a 
(little)  step in disfavor  towards an idealized organic  state conceptualization 
was nevertheless not a step in favor of the foreigner in the sense of a qualita-
tive improvement of a relocation of the relation between the foreigner and the 
state.
Thus, the Aliens’ Law of 1965 did continue to prioritize the interests of the 
state in accordance with the economic needs formulated by the entrepreneurs. 
The rotation principle was the key word for a temporary and economically de-
termined functionalization of immigration policies during the 1960s. Foreign 
workers should be employed and sent back according to the necessities of the 
labor market. This was clearly stated as the backbone of recruitment policies in 
a meeting organized by the  Federal National Association of German Employers 
(Bundesvereinigung Deutscher Arbeitgeberverbände) in 1966.12 In the center of 
such an economically determined approach the temporary character  of  im-
11 Franz (1984, p. 82).
12 Okyayuz (1999, p. 32).
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migration policies was emphasized, and the contents of  the bilateral  agree-
ments  did  also  not  include  any  social  notions, because  both  receiving  and 
sending countries evaluated the employment of the recruited labor force as a 
sort  of  developmental  model aiming at  wiping out socio-economical  differ-
ences  between developing and developed countries. The workers  should be 
ideally  skilled in  the receiving countries  and after  their  return they should 
function as “human capital” in the sense of contributing innovatively to their 
home economies. The precondition of such a developmental approach to labor 
migration would have been a consequent handling of the above-mentioned ro-
tation model in addition to possibilities provided for the foreign laborers in or-
der to improve professional skills. None of these preconditions were realized in 
practice; what happened was the emergence of social dynamics such as family 
reunification starting to a great extent during the mid- and late 1960s. Thus, 
the basis for implementing social immigration policies was already prepared 
during these times, but the contents of immigration policies in this recruit-
ment period (which was in fact no longer a pure recruitment period) did re-
main economically determined.
The  most  important  obstacle  in  implementing  a  social  immigration 
policy was the insistence on the rotation model and the unwillingness to ac-
cept that more and more labor migrants began to see Germany as their coun-
try of  residence, that  they had begun to become settlers. Thus, the right of 
family reunification, maybe the most important factor of integration during 
this period, being under the protection of the Basic Law,13 was handled in such 
a bureaucratic manner that it was difficult to provide a feeling to the foreign-
ers that they were accepted by the German state and society. In 1966, Ulrich 
Freiherr von Gienanth, the chairman of a working group called Foreign Workers 
organized  under  the  umbrella  of  the  Union  of  German  Employers (Bund 
Deutscher Arbeitgeber) formulated the wide-spread understanding of integra-
tion (in a broader sense) and family reunification (in a narrow sense) in the 
context of immigration policies with these words: “The great advantage of em-
ploying foreigners lies in the fact that they constitute a highly mobile labor 
force  potential.  It  can  have  very  dangerous  results  to  limit  this  mobility 
through  an  extensive  settlement  policy” (Der  Arbeitgeber  1966). The  politi-
cal-legal foundations for such an understanding were laid in the formulations 
13 This can be derived from two parts of the Basic Law. In a general sense from Article 20c, Clause 1, where Germany is 
defined via its social state principle, and concretely from Article 6, where the marriage institution and the protection of the 
family is mentioned. 
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of the Principles Concerning Foreigners Policy (Grundsätze zur Ausländerpolitik), 
whose aim was to “prevent the harmful impacts of an increasing number of 
family  relatives  of  foreign  workers  moving  in  an  disorganized  way  to 
Germany”.14 With  the  speech  of  “harmful  impacts”,  the  possible  increasing 
amount of expenditures of the local institutions for the foreigners resulting 
from demands for bigger housing facilities, for more kindergarden and school 
locations and expanded health and transportation opportunities were meant.15 
The “social  costs” of  foreign labor  force employment was something which 
was not foreseen during the 1960s, and consequently political  actors  on all 
levels  had  difficulties  to  adapt  their  immigration-theoretical  conceptualiza-
tions to this factual situation resulting from uncontrollable social dynamics.
The political-legal framework and the surrounding “official” discourse on 
immigration and integration was mainly carried out by political and economic 
actors locating immigration policies around the possibility of functionalizing 
them in the sense of solving internal problems and providing the best possible 
efficiency  for  the  economic  sphere. Social  actors  (such  as  labor  unions)  re-
mained in general outside these processes of policy-making until the 1970s. It 
is not astonishing that under these circumstances the opinions and strategies 
of the foreigners themselves were not considered as worthwhile to constitute 
guidelines within the process of establishing policy contents, or to be sincerely 
discussed in public. The fact that there was no need for any legitimation of 
political decision due to the exclusion of foreigners from public participation 
played another important role besides above-mentioned economic priorities 
for the lack of social  notions during these years. Until  the beginning of the 
1970s – setting political elections on local, regional and federal levels aside – 
foreigners were even excluded from elections to labor union committees.16
Another point significant for enabling/disabling and/or easing/harden-
ing processes of integration is the educational aspect. Rather than providing 
support based on the different socio-cultural backgrounds of the school chil-
dren, which was later tried to be done through the establishment of research 
areas such as Migrantenpädagogik, a fast absorption “of foreigners into normal 
German classes as quickly as possible” was demanded by the Standing Confer-
ence of State Ministers of Educations (Ständige Bildungsminisiterkonferenz) in 
14 AstA-Auslandsreferat der Universität und Evangelische Studentengemeinde Stuttgart (1972, p. 141).
15 Bech/Faust (1981, pp. 112–113).
16 Geiger (1982, pp. 169–189).
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1964. Under these circumstances, it does not astonish that the failure rate of 
foreign  pupils  until  and  throughout  the  1970s  was  very  high  compared  to 
those of  the German children.17 The highly selective German school system, 
which could and can be observed in general for the whole generation of school 
children, became one of the most significant integrational barriers for migrant 
children in the past and continues to be one in the present.
Germany’s attempt to make a radical break with its past based on the 
trauma of the socio-historical experience with fascism may be considered suc-
cessful for a lot of spheres of state and society. The expansion of basic rights 
formulations within legal texts, a continuing transparency within the relation 
of the citizen and the state, the democratization (that means the de-hierarchi-
zation) of the universities as a result of critical approaches coming in particular 
from the students, the consideration of social rights … this list of developments 
within the framework of a “new” Germany can be without doubt continued. 
However, developments in the sense of a positive legalization and in the sense 
of an increasing importance of a civil understanding of state and society con-
stituting a qualitative break from an authoritarian past did not include the for-
eigners during this period. They remained part of continuing traditions most 
significantly expressed in the above-mentioned prioritization of the interests 
of the state in accordance with the economic needs of the economic actors. 
Emphasis on the Social Dimension in the 1970s 
Starting with the mid-1970s, one can state demands for a step-by-step return 
to the rotation policies of the 1960s, whose realization would have factually 
meant nothing else than “immigration policies in the form of labor market 
policies”.18 In this context the Memorandum of the State Government of Baden-
Wuerttemberg (Denkschrift  der  Baden-Württembergischen Landesregierung), 
published at the beginning of 1975, should be mentioned, in which – among 
others – policies aiming at promoting the return of foreigners to their native 
countries through purposeful material, legal and ideal measures, and the limi-
tation of  the  duration  of  stay of  foreigners  planned to  be  prospectively  re-
cruited to a maximum of five years was demanded. Thus, the catchphrase of 
the  “guest-worker”  (Gastarbeiter)  being  used  a  long  time  in  the  immigra-
17 Boos-Nünning et al. (1976).
18 Okyayuz (1993, pp. 119–121).
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tion-political  debate,  which  can  be  taken  as  the  reflection  of  the  rotation 
policies of the 1960s were somehow backed politically. It was not earlier than 
in the beginning of the 1990s that a turning away from this term took place; it 
was  then replaced  with  the  commonly used  term “persons  with  migration 
background”.
Despite  above-mentioned demands  for  a  rigid  practice  concerning  the 
treatment of foreigners, the 1970s do nevertheless mark a period after World 
War II in which for the first time the social dimension of (labor) migration was 
openly debated in public. The living and working conditions of the (labor) mi-
grants were – maybe for the first time in such an intensity – debated in public. 
Thus, the important and unique thing was the inclusion of the future perspec-
tives  of  the  migrants  themselves.  The  discourse  “about” the  foreigner  was 
gradually replaced through the debate “with” him.19 In these years, the problem 
of integration made its appearance as a non-preventable social dynamic be-
cause of the far-reaching influx of family members to their relatives abroad; 
rather than being seen in a very limited sense as the “problem” of specific so-
cial groups, it was increasingly perceived and evaluated within the framework 
of the whole society.
The relatively high organizational grade of the foreigners in the labor unions 
is one of the most significant manifestations of the mentioned/underlined so-
cial dimension of those years. In 1974, 25 % of all foreign laborers were organ-
ized in the labor unions, whereby this share increased to 33.6 % by 1981. The 
share in the total organizational grade was 8.1 %.20 These data can be inter-
preted  as  the  “material”  reflection  of  this  socialization  process  within  the 
framework of the problem of integration.
Another significant indication for the social dimension is the “interven-
tion” of the “second generation” migrants in debates concerning their own fu-
ture perspectives, which have been increasingly observed since the mid-1970s. 
This generation developed a sense for their own environment that the genera-
tion of their mothers and fathers was still not able to do because of structural 
reasons (such as missing knowledge of the language and the socio-cultural and 
political conditions of the receiving countries). This development, which took 
place parallel to and in union with the situation in the labor unions, forced the 
policy actors to react. One of the gains of these developments was the mul-
19 Barth (2007).
20 Frey (1982, p. 393).
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ti-layered  use  of  the  term  “integration”,  nowadays  being  often  interpreted 
solely in its cultural and ethnic dimension. The problem of integration touched 
upon in the preliminary remark is hereby part of such a mono-factorial per-
ception of what integration might be.
Finally, the debates about possibilities of social and political participation 
of  the foreign population at  local  and regional  level  should be pointed out. 
Even if the conditions of such a participation are currently realized to a limited 
extent  solely  in a  few countries, the debates  in the 1970s  nevertheless  had 
severe impacts on the establishment of political and legal instruments such as 
immigrants’ councils (Ausländerbeirate) starting to work in the beginning of 
the 1980s. The importance of these councils does not consist of their mere ex-
istence due to the fact that they are and always have been “powerless and mar-
ginal” and are in no way “institutionalized channels of access to the political 
process”.21 But, they are (or may hopefully be) initial instruments of a process 
leading to social participation forms independent from a formal citizenship 
status enabling the foreigners to be the determining parts of political decision-
making processes in matters of their own concern. The focus hereby should be 
on processuality rather than on stating certain time periods and/or “events” as 
negative or positive, the more so because Germany’s effort is not only to imple-
ment “new” immigration policies as a sort of political-technical practice but 
also to overcome deep-rooted approaches as mentioned in the part of this text 
dealing with Germany’s conceptualization of the “state”.
The last point refers to the interactive relationship between social com-
mitment  and  politics,  which  was  expressed  by  the  content  of  the  memo-
randum of the Federal Official in charge of Immigrants, Heinz Kühn, published 
in September 1979. In this text the social dimension of (im)migration reflected 
in all  above-mentioned forms with the special  emphasis on the integration 
topic was taken into account for the first time at an official level. This can be 
clearly seen through the demands for the acknowledgement of a factual im-
migration process having taken place since the late 1960s within the context 
of family reunification, for the naturalization option of foreigners and for giv-
ing (active) electoral rights on local level.22 The basic essence of these demands 
consisted in dismantling the state’s disposition over the foreigners resulting 
from the contents of the Aliens’ Law by accepting them as a minority actively 
21 Koopmans/Statham (1999, p. 666).
22 Kühn (1979).
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participating in the social life of the host countries. Furthermore, for the first 
time in the German post-war period, the “instrument” of double citizenship, 
which is currently (again) not part of the official immigration-political agenda, 
was introduced as an important integral part of immigration policies in the de-
bates on legal policy.23 The demands of the Kühn-Memorandum were also ar-
ticulated  by  social  actors  such  as  the  mentioned  labor  unions;  but  also 
churches, certain groups within political  parties, the German Lawyers  Asso-
ciation,  student  groups,  initiatives,  platforms  and  discussion  groups  “dis-
covered” the issue of migration and migrants. Refugees having fled from con-
servative-military dictatorships such as the one in Chile played an important 
role in this process of social mobilization, attempting to promote public de-
bates concerning the underlying reasons forcing people to leave their home 
countries. The “socialization” of the issue was somehow completed by “histo-
rizing” it, whereby both aspects draw attention from the “political” to the “so-
cial” sphere. In concrete terms – before and after the contents of the Kühn-
Memorandum were published – these social actors raised the voice for con-
crete integration programs instead of assimilation “which works toward mak-
ing foreign workers and their families into Germans”.24 “[C]harging that the re-
cruitment policy to date has been structured nearly exclusively according to 
the political criteria of the labor market”,25 for programs promoting the living 
together of foreigners and Germans rather than living side-by-side, for the ac-
knowledgement of different national identities and finally for a sort of “positive 
discrimination” in favor of the foreigners in order to secure social equality.26
Since the Memorandum is one of the most important cornerstones and 
points of contentions of current developments in the sphere of immigration 
policies with special emphasis on integration, some remarks will be made in 
the following chapters of this text. 
Despite all these developments, which can be evaluated as quite positive 
for the integration process of the foreigners in the long run, the immigration 
law as the fundament of immigration policies remained still valid in the form 
of an “exceptional legal framework system”. If one measures its criteria with 
the standards of classical liberal legal norms, it is not possible to speak of a leg-
23 Okyayuz (1993, p. 200).
24 Christlich-Demokratische Union (1977, p. 3).
25 Arbeiterwohlfahrt (1973, p. 8), O’Brien (1988, p. 123).
26 Arbeiterwohlfahrt (1973, p. 13).
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alization process in favor of the migrants within the sphere concerning the re-
lation between foreigner and the bourgeois state. The three central categories 
of law and the administration of justice – legitimacy, commitment to norms and 
legal compliance – are essentially not present in the contents of immigration 
laws.27 In none of the legal regulations having emerged since the ratification of 
the “first” post-war immigration law of 1965, we can state qualitative improve-
ments concerning these categories; at best, partial quantitative corrections (such 
as the extension of legal compliance for the migrants or – formulated the other 
way round – the narrowing of the broad disposition permission of the immi-
gration bureaus over the foreigners) were made from time to time.28 But, nev-
ertheless, besides all above-mentioned critical points, these corrections should 
be indeed annotated positively to draw a preferably differentiated picture of 
the situation. The 1970s might be characterized as a period of continuity and 
change, in which we can state a parallel of two (categorically different) con-
flicting dynamics.
On the one hand, we can state the continuity of an understanding con-
cerning the relation between the “foreigner” and the state emphasizing and 
prioritizing issues such as the stabilization of the “system”, the preservation of 
“structures”  and  an  understanding  of  policy-making  as  an  autonomous 
“sphere in itself” that is quasi-untouchable by social actors. One of the main 
reasons for this continuing rigidity in implementing immigration policies was 
the fear of disorder resulting from “a wave of wild cat strikes” led in large part 
by foreigners”;29 Turkish workers in particular played an important role during 
the strikes taking place in the Ford factory in Cologne.30 These events of the 
early 1970s are – among others – are indicators of the fact that the image of the 
foreigners as obedient and quiescent did not match the realities.31 But rather 
than trying to handle this reality in the sense of embedding it into solution 
mechanisms aiming at evaluating the foreigners as an active part of the totality 
of the “social”, measurements such as a recruitment stop for foreign workers 
from non-EC countries in 1973 only weeks after the above mentioned strikes,32 
the “disclosure of illegal employment of foreigners” because of their blocking 
27 Okyayuz (1993, pp. 90–91).
28 Ibid. (pp. 150–152).
29 O’Brien (1988, p. 118).
30 Hildebrandt and Olle (1975).
31 Tsiakalos (1983, pp. 79–91).
32 O’Brien (1988, p. 118).
    Continuity and Change: Immigration Policies in Germany from the Sixties to the Present 241
of the jobs for Germans,33 the deportation of foreigners “who had fallen back 
on  unemployment  compensation  or  social  welfare” even  if  they  possessed 
work and residence permits34 or the reduction of “the maximum age at which 
children of foreigners could enter Germany from 20 to 17” in 1978 were under-
taken.35
On the other hand, demands for a comprehensive social integration of 
labor  migrants  could  no  longer  be  excluded  from  the  immigration-political 
agenda; and parts of this agenda were reflected in the sense of attempting to 
establish improvements within the sphere of aliens’ rights as reflected most 
concretely in the Kühn-Memorandum. But the increasing impacts of such de-
mands only represent one aspect in shaping immigration policies in the sense 
of introducing for the first time issues such as social integration. The other as-
pect, which should be taken into consideration, and which exceeds the limits 
of the responsibilities of the nation-state after World War II, was Germany’s in-
tegration into a network of international relations, emphasizing – among oth-
ers – the importance of human rights. The rigid treatment of foreigners did ba-
sically not suit this context. Reminiscences of a fascist past could easily harm 
or even destroy Germany’s new-gained reputation among the Western allies. 
The sensitivity of the issue can be most clearly “read” from the words of Chan-
cellor Helmut Schmidt reproaching “the cynical exploitation of certain latent 
hostilities toward foreigners” as irresponsible.36 It might be not too exagger-
ated  to  state  that  the  roots  of  an  in-togetherness  of  internal  and  external 
factors, and additionally – after the 1990s – the in-togetherness of migration 
movements and globalization,37 which are currently significantly shaping mi-
gration flows in general and immigration policies in particular, were laid in 
these years. 
33 Dohse (1981, p. 321).
34 Ibid. (pp. 336–341).
35 Bundesministerium für Arbeit (1977).
36 Thränhardt (1984, p. 124).
37 Okyayuz (2005, p. 241).
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The Turn of the 1980s: 
Limitation of Immigrant Influx and Return Promotion Instead of Integration? 
Starting with the 1980s the social dimension of migration, e.g., migration in its 
specificity as an expression of social  dynamics, was increasingly embedded 
into the framework of a debate on the “foreigner problem”. Perceptions and 
conceptions in the field of immigration policies brought into the debate from 
now on encompassed policy-steering instruments such as the prohibition of 
the moving in from children to their mothers or fathers living solitarily in Ger-
many, and the implementation of a compulsory residence permit even for chil-
dren younger than 16 years.38
Hereby, the fundamental  position of  such concepts  was the “efficient” 
limitation of the further immigration of foreigners to Germany and the pro-
motion of their willingness to return to the countries of their origin.39 Parallel 
to this, an improvement of the economic and social integration of the foreign-
ers having lived for years in Germany was also part of the debate.40
But even before, starting with the mid-1970s up to the early 1980s, the 
policy-steering instrument of influx suspensions to certain regions, cities and 
city quarters was enforced. The reasoning (of the Federal Ministry of Labor and 
Social Order in 1976) underlying this policy proceeded on the assumption that 
the number of foreigners exceeding a predefined percentage within the total 
population would  put  a  strain  on the  “social  infrastructure”.41 Obviously, as 
early as in those years, parts of the official political actors began to assume 
that the integration process had failed. In this context, solutions were sought 
at the administrative-political level. In the 1990s, we will again meet a similar 
understanding, which will be evaluated throughout this text.
The above-mentioned developments in conjunction with a steadily in-
creasing use of terms such as “foreigner control” and “immigration control”42 in 
the public migration debate show priority shifts within the sphere of the socio-
38 Staatsministerium Baden-Württemberg (1981).
39 With the Programme for Financial Return Aids (Programm für finanzielle Rückkehrhilfen) from 1.12.1983, which found its 
expression in the “Law for the Promotion of the Return Willingness of Foreigners (“Gesetz zur Förderung der Rückkehrbe-
reitschaft von Ausländern”), the willingness to return started to be sanctioned institutionally (BT [Bundestags]-Drucksache 
X/351).
40 Bundesministerium des Innern (1982, p. 73).
41 Rist (1980, p. 83).
42 Bojadzijev/Mulot/Tsianos (2007).
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political perception of migration/migrants and the implementation of immi-
gration policies. The migrants having begun to actively participate in planning 
strategies concerning social and immigration policies since the 1970s, or – at 
least – having shown the will to do so, were somehow downgraded to “objects 
of policies”. Parallel to this development, one can state a Europe-wide develop-
ment of institutionalized migration/migrant research. What took place was a 
“scientification” of the “foreigner problem”. Of course, research based on an ob-
jective-scientific basis is to be appreciated by all means. The migration centers 
having been built up since the 1980s have currently been doing research in 
fields such as migrants’ pedagogics or multilingual education; and as such they 
account for a diversification of migration and the migrant population and fi-
nally for the social dimension of migration mentioned above. Nevertheless it 
should be noticed that the point of departure of this development, which can 
be evaluated as quite positive from the standpoint of the migrants themselves, 
is located within the framework of the above-mentioned premises of the im-
migration-political  approaches of the 1980s. Since the migrant population is 
bound to the immigration law, whose standards are not or only partially sub-
ject to “normal” legal state norms, their living and working condition are al-
ways “exceptional”. Thus, a legalization process, of which the results are nor-
mally  positive  for  the  native  population,  can  mean  the  contrary  for  the 
migrants. In this context, also a “scientification” in the field of migration re-
search can have these negative results for the migrants. These remarks should 
be interpreted as an example for the “reading between the lines” as mentioned 
above.
The immigration-political priority shifts having taken place in the 1980s 
did  find their  expression also at  the level  of  political  statements. Thus, the 
former Prime Minister of Berlin, Richard von Weizsäcker, proclaimed the fol-
lowing commentary in June of 1981: “Either return to the home country … or 
stay in Berlin; this has to include the decision to become German on the long 
run. [....] Berlin must stand the wall. But our city cannot stand fences we build 
up by ourselves”.43
These  words  depict  a  drifting  away from  the  option  of  naturalization 
(and thus from the option of double citizenship), having been formulated in 
the Kühn Memorandum from 1979. They set the preference in favor of an in-
tegration model, where the foreigners are accepted as building stones of social-
43 Gesemann (2009, p. 315). 
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structure  formation  and  development  solely  under  exclusion  of  their  own 
identity.
Quite a few statements corresponding to that of von Weizsäcker from the 
point of meaning can be stated in that decade. Thus, in a statement to the 
press in November 11, 1981, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said that there is agree-
ment on the point “that Germany is not an immigration country and shall not 
be so”.44 Following up these words, the Federal government decided on its im-
migration-political tenets dated February 1982, that “only by means of a con-
sequent and efficient policy of migration influx limitation [...] an indispensable 
acceptance of the German population concerning the integration of foreign-
ers” could be ensured. And continuing: “This is of absolute necessity for the 
preservation of social harmony”.45 In such a manner the leitmotif of a non-im-
migration  country  “had  been  already  established  at  the  end  of  Helmut 
Schmidt’s chancellorship [...] and can be identified as the basic principle of Fed-
eral  German immigration policies until  the late  nineties”.46 Until  now, alto-
gether with the problem of double citizenship, the question of immigration 
(migrants’ influx) is the controversially conducted central topic of immigration 
policies in Germany.
By reading the following inventory of  developments  starting with the 
1990s, the fact shall be taken into consideration that meanwhile a third and 
even  forth  migrant  generation is  growing  up in Germany, one  made  up  of 
people who hardly know anything about their home countries, and the majori-
ty of whom are even in possession of the German citizenship. Even if Germany 
factually has become an immigration country, the mainstream conceptualiza-
tion consisting of a denial of this fact is still determining the guiding principles 
of immigration policies today. First attempts to change this situation (after the 
hopeful Kühn Memorandum) can be seen in the contents of the first draft of the 
actual Immigration Law of 2005, which was formulated in 2002. The principles 
formulated under the overall control of Rita Süssmuth (Süssmuth Commission) 
allowed for the acknowledgement of the thesis of Germany being an immigra-
tion country and for the possibility of double citizenship.47 
44 Bundesministerium des Innern (1998, p. 10).
45 Bundesregierung (1982, p. 7). 
46 Hell (2005, p. 81).
47 This is the most far-reaching attempt to date to change immigration-political perceptions and concepts valid until now. 
So far, it is the last attempt in a series of similar ventures. For example, in March 1992, the former Federal Official in charge 
of Immigrants, Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen, raised demands “whereupon children of labor migrants born in Germany 
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At  this  point,  it  might  be  useful  to  make  some  remarks  within  the 
European context. Some countries such the United Kingdom have been accept-
ing the instrument of double citizenship for a long time by evaluating it as a 
necessity for living together; additionally, their colonialist past had practical 
impacts in establishing forms of “multiculturalism” without necessarily using 
this term.48 Germany, on the other hand, together with countries like Austria 
and Luxemburg, “has taken a more restrictive view of dual nationality, espe-
cially when it arises during the naturalization of non-nationals”.49 Germany’s 
negative approach is in general located around four arguments, whereby cer-
tain continuities concerning the prioritization of the political over the social 
can be stated as the driving force. Firstly, a loyalty conflict between the indi-
vidual and his belongings to different countries is mentioned. Accordingly, this 
is claimed to be hardening a successful integration process of the foreigners. 
Secondly, legal uncertainties are mentioned concerning issues such as inherit-
ance law. Thirdly, an unequal situation between “normal” and naturalized cit-
izens  are  claimed  to  have  arisen. Fourthly, international  regulations, which 
Germany did sign in the past (such as the 1963 Council of Europe Convention 
on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality), are claimed to build up legal 
mechanisms against double or multiple citizenship.50
Germany represents an “ethnocultural  exclusionist citizenship regime”. 
As a result, a big number of the German-born people with a migration back-
ground have still the status of foreigners lacking full political rights whereas 
countries such as Great Britain and Sweden offer a much easier access to “full 
social and political rights”.51
Germany’s argumentative patterns are mainly politically motivated, but 
there are some sociological “facts” which could be used as counter-arguments. 
Nowadays, at least one fifth of the non-national  population is born in Ger-
many, and if speaking of issues such as loyalty to the country of nationality, it 
would be a mere hypothetical construction to start from such a loyalty conflict. 
The reality is that the big majority of these people would have no problems 
carrying two or more passports. Loyalty is not a theoretical issue but a result of 
should automatically receive the German citizenship without having to give up the own one” (Okyayuz [1993, p. 15]). For the 
detailed content of these demands, see Süddeutsche Zeitung (1992, p. 2).
48 Hansen (2002).
49 Green (2005, p. 921). 
50 Green (2005, p. 922). 
51 Koopmans/Statham (1999, p. 661).
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concrete living and working conditions, which are centered in concreteness 
around  Germany  as  the  factual  new  home  for  future life. In  current  years, 
these aspects of an ongoing social reality going beyond political statements 
has increasingly become part of scientific research mostly supporting the idea 
that double citizenship would cause no danger for the interests of the state by – 
at the same time – being aware of the limits of such instruments. The debates 
on citizenship, naturalization and integration do more and more (and again) 
include debates on double citizenship as one of the possible instruments not to 
enable but to ease integration.52
The fact  that some important central  citizenship rights, such as social 
rights, are – by all the critiques throughout this text – more or less factually 
available for all inhabitants of Germany independent from the issue of citizen-
ship/nationality  has led to  formulations such as  “post-national” citizenship, 
seeming  to  underestimate  formal  citizenship.53 But, the  rights  in  the  social 
state’s framework should be completed through the political and legal rights. 
Only within this totality can a real re-shift to the social be seen as a potential. 
A “re-socialization” of immigration policies through an active social participa-
tion of the foreigners themselves, touched upon in the previous chapter, can 
only be achieved by including legal rights. The discourse of a “post-national” 
citizenship should be enriched through/with the help of a political and legal 
framework giving the foreigners a secure status to be not only named as part 
of the society but to be it factually. 
The above-mentioned claim of the importance and significance of formal 
citizenship preferably in the form of double/multiple citizenship can be con-
cretized by emphasizing the fact that it is a precondition for gaining certain 
rights.  Having access to full voting rights and to civil servant positions as a 
Beamter (a special state employment status being somehow a prerequisite for 
middle- and high-ranking positions) are only some of the issues enabling a 
person to become “part” of the society. Evaluated from this standpoint, citizen-
ship/double  citizenship  is  strongly  related  to  the  issue  of  integration.  But 
rather than evaluating it as a step towards integration, by the political author-
ities it was seen as a final point of a successful integration process.
Shortly after the passing of the law at the beginning of 2003, the Consti-
tutional Court nullified it in December of the same year. Finally, on January 1, 
52 For a detailed view see, among others, Faist (2004), Hagedorn (2001), Koslowski (2000).
53 Soysal (1994), Joppke (1999).
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2005, the current Immigration Law came into effect though no longer contain-
ing  the  integration-political  suggestions  of  the  Süssmuth  Commission.  The 
concrete contents will be gone into below.
The  discourse  of  a  possible  “foreigner  and  immigration  control” does 
mark conceptualities, which refer to a process moving away from the social 
level to a political-administrative one. The reduction of the influx age from 18 
to 16 years concerning adolescents aiming at joining their parents is one ex-
ample for such a shift. Since the beginning of the controversies on the actual 
Immigration Law, there have been (and are still) also demands for a further re-
duction from 16 to ten years.54 One of the most important reasons why family 
(re-) unification has always played an important role in all immigration-polit-
ical debates since the beginning of foreign labor recruitment policies in the 
mid-1950s consists of the fact that it was one of the social dynamics which – 
from the very beginning until now – could not be administered. The more it 
had been tried, countermeasures were taken against this dynamic since the 
end of the 1970s/the beginning of the 1980s by means of using nearly all legal 
and political instruments.
Consequently, not only, Europe or worldwide economic crisis symptoms 
of whom first signs can be detected in the context of the petrol crisis in 1973 
and of whom the preliminary culmination point of those years was reached at 
the beginning of  the 1980s, but also can similar  developments be stated in 
most of the other Western European receiving countries such as Austria, Belgium 
or Switzerland. 
These developments towards a more restrictive practice of legal regula-
tions concerning migrants were based on three premises, which are, to a big 
extent, still valid until now:
- The first  of  these premises started from the point that (and this  is 
even more the case nowadays) the integration of the “foreign fellow 
citizens”  has  failed  to  a  big  extent.55 The  above-mentioned  mul-
tilayered approach of the 1970s attempting to anticipate a holistic per-
ception of integration was replaced by a one-sidedly cultural- and eth-
nical-defined integration debate. It seemed (and seems) to be forgotten 
in the flow of this debate that integration always means disintegration 
at the same time. Disintegration in the sense that only somehow “integ-
54 Welt-Online (2003).
55 In this context the sensational heading of the weekly journal Der Spiegel (1997) shall be remembered: “Dangerously Ali-
en, The Failure of the Multicultural Society (Gefährlich fremd, Das Scheitern der multikulturellen Gesellschaft)”.
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rated” persons can understand the society in which they live to the ex-
tent that  they again can disintegrate themselves. The first  migrant 
generation  was, evaluated from such a  point  of  view, neither  inte-
grated nor disintegrated. They “solely” lived and worked.
- The second premise was based on the more or less openly articulated 
hypothesis  that  the  receiving  countries  were  still  “not  prepared” 
enough to cope with social tensions and conflicts resulting from the 
influx of new immigrants.
- The third hypothesis was based on a discourse of identity and culture 
as factors of difference, not unity. As a result of this premise (altogether 
with changes in  the global  agenda such as the renaissance of  new 
conservatisms, of nationalism, of the decline of the Soviet Union and 
furthermore of  the shifting away from egalitarian social  policies to 
neoliberal policy conceptualizations) the migrants were increasingly 
functionalized as a means for constructing something like a European 
identity. The counter model of such a European identity was located 
especially among the Muslim migrant community, independent from 
the fact of how these migrants themselves would define their own 
identity. 
From the 1990s to the Present: 
Political-Administrative Approaches to “Manage” the “Foreigner Problem”
Since the beginning of the 1990s, we can state attempts to “solve” the “foreign-
er problem” at a political and administrative level. Legal debates on citizenship, 
on the social and political participation of migrants and on regulations con-
cerning residence and work permits were held in order to solve the problems 
of persons evaluated as not capable of or willing to integrate themselves into 
the host societies. Whether with them or against them does not hereby play a 
significant role within the flow of the current debates.56 
Concerning the case of Germany lately, the main focus is on the Turkish 
migrant population being “registered” as non-European since the assault on 
the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York and their destruction 
in  September  11,  2001.  This  situation  may  be  reflected  the  best  within  the 
framework of the process of Turkey’s EU access negotiations, and the hereby 
invoked debate on European basic values and cornerstones that Turkey, and as 
56 Barbieri (1998).
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such Turkey’s rooted population abroad, are accused of having nothing in com-
mon with. 
In  such  a  manner  the  former  SPD Member  of  the Federal  Parliament, 
Martin Neuffer, evaluated Turkey’s rooted population in Germany in 1986 as a 
group  of  persons  who  could  not  be  integrated:  “The  boat  is  full  and  he 
answered  the  question, whether  Germany  was  an  immigration  country  or 
not”.57 But even before, since the end of the 1970s, representatives – again of the 
SPD – had been articulating similar slogans.58
Starting with the beginning of the 1990s this sort (and similar sorts) of 
political conceptualizations concerning social order founded the headstone for 
the institutionalization and legalization of social dynamics of migration. The 
latest developments, such as the fact that persons from the former socialist 
countries after their decline immigrated to the Western European countries in 
general, those Russians of German ethnical origin (Aussiedler) immigrated to 
Germany  in  particular  and  furthermore  the  emerging  debate  on  asylum 
policies (having found first results in the latest regulations of the Refugee Law 
of 1993), altogether with attempts to differentiate between political and eco-
nomic asylum seekers and to predefine which countries could be stated as “se-
cure” and which could not, were added to the migration agenda.
Despite initiating a sincere and differentiated debate on the new (old) 
“global migration” issue, meaning the reasons for the emergence and the de-
velopment of a phenomenon, which actually is one of the determining factors 
within international relations, we have to state priority shifts towards a man-
agement of migration by means of political and legal instruments since the 
1970s. Nevertheless, from the point of view of the official policy actors there 
are in fact important reasons for such shifts. The most important ones can be 
listed as follows:
- Economic  and  demographic  changes  resulting  in  an  increased  de-
mand for qualified labor force;
- The inability of existing mechanisms and instruments (such as the 
former Immigration Law from 1991) to promote the integration pro-
cess of the migrants;
- Demands for an easing of naturalization; 
- The fight against illegal (im)migration;
57 For a comment of Neuffer from 1982 with similar meaning, see Neuffer (1982).
58 Fakten Fiktionen (2009).
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- Demands for a re-organization of the administrative responsibilities 
of the Immigration Bureaus;
- Demands for a harmonization of  immigration policies at the Euro-
pean level;
- Demands for a redefinition and reclassification of the different mi-
grants groups according to their political and legal status.
At this point, we have to note honestly that at the beginning of the period, 
where the above-mentioned priority shifts took place, legal improvements for 
the migrants were also demanded to be realized. Throughout the acting period 
of the Federal Government composed of social democrats and members of the 
“green” party from 1998 to 2005, the focus of prospective immigration policies 
was laid on the integration of the migrants living in Germany for a long time 
on the basis of extended political and legal rights. The beginning of this coali-
tion marks a – indeed short-lasting – renaissance to “socialize” the “foreigner 
problem” again rather than to “manage” or “solve” it solely on an administra-
tive level. Important evidence for this claim can be seen in the fact that the 
topic of double citizenship was also thrown into the debate again. 
But actually, after the failure of all these “social” attempts in the sense 
that the suggestions and demands of the Süssmuth Commission and later the 
contents of the law in 2003 were thrown out by the Constitutional Court, once 
more the priorities have changed meaning that the strand of the 1980s was re-
newed. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the composition of the 
actors as well as the focus on basic questions have changed. Additionally, new 
actors have “entered” the debate and are significantly determining the flow of 
the debates. Institutes claiming academic standards such as the “Institute for 
Economic Research“ in Berlin, as well as representatives of the Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry, are drawing the main attention of their immigration-
political  perceptions and conceptions to  demographic  and economic points, 
and to the prevention of the immigration of a new unqualified foreign labor 
force manifesting itself, for example, in the – still unfinished – “green card” de-
bate. “Foreigner control” was replaced by the term “controlled” immigration, 
meaning lastly the extension of the disposition competence of the immigra-
tion bureaus over the migrants.
Throughout the publicly led debate on migration and integration, which 
is meanwhile dominated by the actors mentioned above, it seems not to be dif-
ficult to assess xenophobic and even racist notions focussing on the point that 
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persons of  non-European origin are  – first  and foremost –  a  threat  for  the 
European countries and societies, and as such have the duty to prove their suit-
ability for these locations.59 This seems to be also reflected in the new Immig-
ration Law (together with its latest modifications dated from July 2007). If all 
its contents would be practiced, Germany would become, according to a state-
ment of Pro Asyl, “less attractive, colder and hostile to integration”.60
With regard to this “coldness” raised by Pro Asyl, the fact that it is used to 
try to “solve” the issue of integration at the level of administrative measures is 
of determining significance. Obligatory language courses and the introduction 
of a points system measuring qualification are only a few of these measures.61 
We have to admit that the knowledge of the language of the society where 
people live is undoubtedly of great – more than this: of existential – impor-
tance for successful integration. Integration, however, is on the other hand a 
complex social  process whose “realization” is  determined by a multitude of 
factors. A reduction of this multitude to the administrative level is not by far 
enough to accommodate this complexity.
Conclusion: Changing Priorities and the Continuing Debate on 
Multiculturality and Integration
The course of the above-mentioned framework-conditions and their contentu-
al priority shifts since the 1970s in unity with a socio-political atmosphere of 
intolerance and a bad conjunctural situation established a political and ideolo-
gical context, in which nearly all attempts to “socialize” the “foreigner prob-
lem” have failed. The thesis of a “failed integration” brought into debate in Ger-
many  in  the  1990s,  widespread  by  the  media,  seems  to  be  actually  also 
accepted in most of the other Western European receiving countries. Even in – 
evaluated from the point of immigration-political framework-conditions and 
their practice – “liberal” countries such as the Netherlands or in countries such 
as the United Kingdom, where practiced “multiculturality” seems to be part of 
the social reality until now, voices demanding more restrictive policies can be 
heard louder and more affirmative from day to day. 
59 Müller (2005).
60 ProAsyl (2007, p. 1).
61 Müller (2005).
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The (im)migrants themselves are criticizing these priority shifts. Hakkı 
Keskin from the Turkish Community in Hamburg is summarizing this critique 
under four main points:62
- The actual regulations of the Immigration Law and their repressive 
practical character are cementing the Immigration Law in the form of 
a defensive law (directed towards the migrants).
- The priorities of the contents of the Immigration Law are determined 
in favor of the economic interests of the German entrepreneurs. 
- The migrants are classified as “good”, “useful” or “less useful”. In this 
context for the migrants classified as “less useful” it will be more dif-
ficult from day to day to secure their residential status.63 
- Factually, it will be more difficult to get an unlimited/residence per-
mit or German citizenship. Formerly, a “basic knowledge of the Ger-
man language” was sufficient for getting citizenship; whereas nowa-
days an “adequate“ one is demanded.
But not solely the living and working conditions of the “long-established” labor 
migrants will have worth according to this critique; also the conditions of the 
qualified ones which are planned to be recruited will be similarly bad as a res-
ult of the unequal relation between migrants and the bourgeois state based on 
the broad disposition competence of the immigration bureaus over the foreign-
ers. They will continue to miss equal rights as compared to the German popu-
lation. Their stay will continue to be temporary. Furthermore, the fact that a 
possible “green card” procedure is only planned to temporarily crack the re-
cruitment stop of 1973 rather than having stringency in itself can be evaluated 
in the sense that a principally new immigration policy is not on the agenda. 
Thus, the cornerstones of a “guest-worker policy” of the 1960s based on a rota-
tional system with timely limited working contracts did not change in principle.
The discourse about an aspired “multicultural society”, having been pro-
claimed in the 1970s by social scientists, pedagogues, representatives of social 
institutions, as well as by parts of the political elite in order to constitute an in-
tegration process of the whole society, is nowadays mainly done at the level of 
the self-identity building of specific social groups. In this context, we can speak 
of  an ethnification of  structural  problems, finally resulting in  similar  coun-
62 Keskin (2003).
63 In times where the “green card“ debate, dealing with a highly qualified foreign labor force, is ongoing, one can state that 
these “less useful“ groups of persons will consist mainly of “classical“ labor migrants having lived for years in Germany.
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ter-reactions from the migrants themselves; a vicious circle disabling real in-
tegration.64
Since the 1980s, a time period in which the social dimension of migration 
was neglected step-by-step in favor of administrative legal measures, the main 
focus within the context of immigration-political debates was on the integra-
tion of the migrants into the host countries. Hereby, integration was more and 
more evaluated in the sense of being a predefined and statical category by em-
phasizing a one-sided active and willful orientation of the migrants towards 
the host countries in the sense of a total acceptance of these host countries’ 
norms and values. As a precondition for such an acceptance, the knowledge of 
culture and language of the host countries is seen to be essential. Undoubtedly, 
such knowledge – as mentioned above – is necessary for the social and politi-
cal participation of the migrants, as well as for their possible success in eco-
nomic affairs. On the other hand, one should consider that such knowledge 
does not “automatically“ create something like sympathy or empathy of the 
migrants for the host countries, or even something like a social “nearness” of 
German citizens with a migration background with their new home countries. 
That means, this knowledge can ease social integration and political identifica-
tion, and maybe it can even create such things to a certain extent; but it can 
never deliver a “guarantee” for this.
However, integration being understood in a holistic sense should not be 
limited to demands directed toward the foreigners to learn certain languages, 
to be useful in economic life, to act socially peaceful and to live according to 
legal norms.
The migrants, who – despite all structural difficulties – begin to develop 
their own integration strategies, accept this one-sided debate on integration 
less and less. They demand changes in the perception and attitudes of receiv-
ing countries towards migration and migrants. Not least their calls for a new 
debate on integration are growing ever louder. 
The portrayed priority shifts of immigration-political contents since the 
1970s found their results in a paradigmatic change from a critical perception 
and conceptualization of integration (with associated debates concerning the 
question of what culture is or might even be) to an administrative-technical 
one. Until  now, questions on the preconditions and methodological practice 
for, and the social carriers of, “right” integration are not answered. These and 
64 Bienfait (2006).
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other – similar – questions, which can be solely answered within the frame-
work  and  in  due  consideration  of  historico-social  processes,  are  currently 
pressed  into  the  context  of  administrative-legal  procedures.  This  approach 
does in no way encourage the migrants to put their own experiences in the 
center of everyday living and working conditions. And the other way round; 
they will not be encouraged to perceive their factual living and working condi-
tions as such from the point of view of their consciousness. But, this is the only 
way “real” integration can work.
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